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Recently, there has been a growing interest in the solvency of fi nancial intermediaries. Bank and in-
surer insolvency cases generated numerous adverse economic effects and also promoted academic 
efforts to design solvency-related taxation methods. The focus of this paper is on corporate taxation 
and its empirical relation to solvency in the Hungarian fi nancial intermediation sector. Based on the 
previous literature, a complex empirical model of the interactions between capital formation, asset 
growth and solvency risk is presented, and panel data results are compared for banks and insurance 
companies. A comparison with international empirical results is also possible, although it may only 
be of limited relevance due to some differences in solvency measurement. The paper also aims to 
highlight the potential differences between banking and insurance. As far as solvency effects are 
concerned, the empirical results do not reveal signifi cant differences in these two sectors; however, 
other results point to the heterogeneity of the Hungarian fi nancial intermediation sector. 
Keywords: banking, insurance, business tax, panel data
JEL classifi cation indices: C23, G21, G22, H25
Borbála Szüle, Associate Professor at the Insurance Education and Research Group, Corvinus Uni-
versity of Budapest. E-mail: borbala.szule@uni-corvinus.hu
64 BORBÁLA SZÜLE
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
1. INTRODUCTION
There is an ongoing debate about optimal taxation in the financial intermedia-
tion sector. Current academic research efforts focus mainly on the relationship of 
solvency and taxation when exploring possible methods for maintaining financial 
stability (e.g. IMF Staff 2010). Developments in regulation such as Basel III for 
banks and Solvency II for insurance companies also underline the importance of 
solvency in the financial system (e.g. ECB 2007, 2014; Jobst et al. 2014). 
Taxation is a significant factor that can impact solvency. As indicated by some 
studies (e.g. Luo – Tanna 2014), corporate income taxation may have had an 
indirect effect on the international financial crisis of 2007–2009 owing to the 
asymmetric tax treatment of debt and equity on the capital structures of financial 
institutions. Yet, current literature about the effects of corporate income taxation 
on the solvency of financial intermediaries is quite limited. 
Empirical evidence about the risk effects of taxation is mixed and depends 
also on the applied methodology. While some empirical results suggest that an 
increase in bank corporate taxes may decrease bank risk (de Nicolò 2010), other 
studies report that the risk reducing effects of taxation are not robust (e.g. Capelle-
Blancard – Havrylchyk 2013; Horváth 2013; Luo – Tanna 2014). Previous results 
are primarily related to the banking sector; possible similar effects in other com-
ponents of the financial intermediation sector such as the insurance industry for 
example, have not yet been thoroughly examined. 
In this paper, a modified version of the model in de Nicolò (2010) is applied to 
explore the solvency risk effects of taxation. De Nicolò (2010) aims at measur-
ing the potential effect of a Financial Stability Contribution Tax and a Financial 
Activity Tax (proposed by IMF Staff 2010 as possible forms of contribution from 
the financial sector) on bank asset growth and banks’ probability of default. As de 
Nicolò (2010) argues, an increase in bank corporate taxes is likely to have a nega-
tive effect on bank asset growth (with lower returns discouraging investments) 
and may adversely affect capital formation as well, and thus a negative impact on 
bank risk is also possible. These forecasting models are applied in the paper with 
a modification concerning the definition of risk measure. 
To highlight heterogeneity within the financial intermediation sector, the paper 
examines Hungarian banking and insurance data separately. Balanced panel data 
covers the period of 1995 to 2013 for both sectors. Our intention was to perform a 
whole sector analysis by including the maximum possible number of institutions. 
This requirement resulted in the inclusion of 22 commercial banks and 18 insur-
ance companies in the analysis. Due to market developments (e.g. the entrance of 
new firms into the financial industry), the share of included data to all data var-
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ies during the examination period, with a high percentage of total assets, equity, 
deposits (for banking sector), and reserves (for insurance sector) being included 
in the analysis. In 2013, the included total assets represented 76 per cent and 83 
per cent of industry assets for banking and insurance, respectively. For that year, 
the panel data represent 78 per cent of the total equity in banking and 80 per cent 
in the insurance industry. In the banking sector, the share of included total depos-
its to all bank deposits is 77 per cent for 2013, while in the insurance sector, the 
ratio of included and all reserves (for unit-linked and other insurance products 
together) is 83 per cent for the same year. 
According to our results, corporate taxation did not have a significant effect on 
asset growth (and thus on risk), neither for banks, nor for insurance companies. 
This result differs from those in de Nicolò (2010), but partly resembles the find-
ings of Capelle-Blancard – Havrylchyk (2013), Horváth (2013), and Luo – Tanna 
2014. Compared to the results in de Nicolò (2010), some other differences may 
also be observed in the forecasting models of capital formation and asset growth. 
Another finding of the paper is that Hungarian banking and insurance sector ef-
fects exhibit certain differences. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant literature 
and introduces the methodology. Section 3 discusses empirical results (with a 
comparison of the Hungarian banking and insurance sector). Section 4 summa-
rises the main conclusions of the paper. 
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Recent financial system developments have fostered research about optimal taxa-
tion methods for financial intermediaries such as banks and insurance compa-
nies. Among other possible options for a “fair and substantial contribution by 
the financial sector”, a report proposed Financial Stability Contribution (FSC) 
and Financial Activities Tax (FAT) as forms of contribution from the financial 
sector (IMF Staff 2010). This report advocated that FSC could be primarily paid 
for the fiscal cost of any future government support to the financial sector, and 
FAT could take up a role similar to value-added tax that is usually applied for 
the corporate sector (Cannas et al. 2014). The potential effects of these taxation 
methods have been examined separately for banks and insurance companies (for 
FSC, see IMF Staff 2010), or only for banks (for FSC and FAT, see de Nicolò 
2010; Cannas et al. 2014). 
Banks have a long history as performing financial intermediation activities 
(e.g. Allen – Santomero 1998; Diamond 1984), but in recent years, the financial 
66 BORBÁLA SZÜLE
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
landscape changed considerably, triggering also a transformation of activities in 
non-bank financial institutions (Scholtens – van Wensveen 2000). In previous 
research, banks have been generally considered as financial intermediaries (e.g. 
Mérő 2004), but currently insurance companies also play an important role in 
financial intermediation and the insurance industry can have systemic risks as 
well, as described, for example, by Schwarcz – Schwarcz (2014). Despite certain 
similarities (e.g. Briys – de Varenne 1995), some of the main features of insurers 
differ significantly from those of banks (e.g. OWC 2001; Morrison 2003; BIS 
2011). A distinction between banks and insurance companies has already also 
been made in the taxation literature, for example when examining Financial Sta-
bility Contribution as a resolution mechanism that could reflect the systemic risk 
contributions of individual institutions (IMF Staff 2010).  
A tax system can be very complex since in an optimal case, the various desir-
able attributes of taxation should be balanced (e.g. Slemrod 1990; Alm 1996). Al-
though tax incidence may prevail in corporate taxation as well (Harberger 1962), 
the traditional goal of a tax on corporate income has been to raise tax revenues as 
efficiently as possible (Devereux – Sørensen 2006). There are several alternative 
views of the “classical” corporate tax system (e.g. Sørensen 1995) and corporate 
taxation is associated with various features of a firm (e. g. Modigliani – Miller 
1958, 1963). It has to be emphasised that the aforementioned FSC and FAT are 
not equivalent to corporate taxes, although their potential effects have been meas-
ured with the application of corporate taxation data in the literature (de Nicolò 
2010). According to the IMF Staff (2010), the main component in FSC would be 
paid for the fiscal cost of any future government support to the financial sector, 
so that also the tax base for banks and insurance companies could differ and FAT 
could take up a role similar to the value-added tax that is usually applied for the 
corporate sector (Cannas et al. 2014) and could be a tax on the sum of profits and 
remuneration in the financial sector (Keen et al. 2010). In practice, the corporate 
tax base may be related to corporate income earned (although the definition of the 
tax base can be quite complex; Devereux – Sørensen 2006). 
In this paper, the results of taxation effects are calculated in a complex empiri-
cal model that is similar to that of de Nicolò (2010). A quantitative estimate of the 
impact of a given increase in corporate taxation is obtained with the application 
of forecasting models (for equity formation, bank asset growth, and the prob-
ability of bank default) and, in addition to this, with projections about bank asset 
growth change-related variations in GDP growth. A simplified structure of this 
estimation model is presented in Figure 1.
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This paper focuses only on the institution-level impacts of corporate taxation.1 
The forecasting models for capital formation, asset growth, and probability of 
default are described by the following equations in de Nicolò (2010): 
 1 1 1 1ln
E E E
it it it i it it itEA EA EA ROA AΔ α β γ ε           (1)
 1 1 2 1 3 1 1ln
G G G G G
it i it it it it itAG TB ROA EA Aα β β β γ θ              (2)
 1 1 2 1 3 1 1ln
R R R R R
it i it it it it itBSM AG ROA EA Aα β β β γ η              (3)
where EAit indicates the ratio of book equity to assets, AGit indicates bank asset 
growth, TBit denotes the effective tax rate, Ait indicates total assets, and the after-
tax return on assets is indicated by ROAit. In Equation (3), the Black-Scholes 
probability of default is denoted by BSMit (with i and t indicating a given bank 
and a given year in the analysis). 
In de Nicolò’s (2010) model, corporate taxation may influence asset growth as 
described by Equation (2), with the effective tax rate being defined as the ratio of 
corporate taxes to pre-tax profits. In the previous literature, the definition of tax 
measure proved to be essential in influencing the statistical significance of em-
pirical results. For example, Luo – Tanna (2014) present two alternative corpo-
rate tax measures (corporate income tax rate and implicit tax rate, defined as the 
ratio of tax expenses over profit before tax), and their results suggest that there is 
1  One of the limitations of the paper is that although the exploration of solvency effects could 
benefit from a more complex model structure, a detailed analysis of the relationship of bank 
asset growth and macroeconomic factors (such as GDP growth) is not included in the paper. 
The lack of the modelling of competition (that theoretically may also be related to the risk 
of bank failures, as described by for example Martinez-Miera – Repullo (2010)) is another 
limitation of the paper.
Figure 1. Simplified model structure
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a statistically significant and negative relationship between corporate income tax 
rate and the bank risk-taking measure when the statutory corporate income tax 
rate is used as a proxy for taxation. However, when the implicit tax rate is used as 
a proxy for taxation, the effect of taxation on risk-taking is only significant in a 
static model, but in a dynamic specification (when the first lag of the risk-taking 
measure is also included in the estimation), this effect is not significant. Capelle-
Blanchard – Havrylchyk (2013) argue that a reason for applying implicit tax rate 
in empirical studies may be that the statutory corporate income tax rate does not 
necessarily reflect the real burden of taxation (since the amount of tax that com-
panies pay may depend also on specific fiscal rules and other factors that may 
influence the tax base). In this paper, the tax measure is defined as an effective tax 
rate (as the ratio of corporate taxes to pre-tax profits, according to the definition 
in de Nicolò 2010). 
Our forecasting model also differs from that in de Nicolò (2010) through the 
definition of solvency. In de Nicolò (2010), bank risk is measured by the Black-
Scholes-Merton probability of default (with higher values indicating higher sol-
vency risk), while in this paper, an accounting-based solvency measure is applied 
(with higher values indicating lower solvency risk). The application of the Black-
Scholes-Merton probability of default (or alternatively, the so-called distance-
to-default) as a risk measure is quite common in the literature (e.g. Blundell-
Wignall – Roulet 2013; Breig – Elsas 2009). The theoretical background for the 
calculation of this risk measure is provided by the option pricing model described 
in Black – Scholes (1973), in which a firm’s equity may be viewed as a call op-
tion on the firm’s assets, and corporate liabilities can also be viewed as options. 
In the Black-Scholes model, the probability of default can be calculated after the 
quantification of assets and the standard deviation of assets (this calculation step 
may require complex methodology and market data). The so-called distance-to-
default, resulting from a relatively simple transformation of the probability of 
default, measures how many standard deviations the asset value needs to drop to 
meet the debt value (Breig – Elsas 2009). In this paper, (daily) market observa-
tions are not available for all companies in the database, thus another measure is 
calculated to quantify the stability of banks and insurance companies. Similarly 
to other studies (e.g. Laeven – Levine 2009; Horváth 2013; Luo – Tanna 2014), a 
Z-score is calculated to measure stability: 
   .
EROA AZ
ROAσ
  (4)
In Equation (4), ROA is the return on assets, σ(RΟΑ) indicates the standard 
deviation of ROA values, and E A is the equity to total assets ratio. The higher 
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value of this Z-score measure indicates lower insolvency risk and hence may be 
considered as a measure of the overall stability of an institution. 
In our paper, the maximum possible amount of data is applied to estimate 
standard deviation of ROA. This means that (due to necessary transformations of 
data) although the balanced panel data cover the period of 1995 to 2013, data in 
the period of 1993 to 2013 are used to estimate standard deviation of return on 
assets. Similarly to the previous literature (e.g. Horváth 2013), the natural loga-
rithm of the Z-score measure is applied. As demonstrated by Table 1, logarith-
misation results in a decreasing (and closer to zero) skewness measure for both 
banking and insurance sector data (thus indicating a more symmetric distribution 
after logarithmisation). 
By applying the logarithmised solvency measure, the estimated model for sol-
vency effects is described by Equation (5):
 1 1 2 1 3 1 1ln ln .
R R R R R
it i it it it it itZ AG ROA EA Aα β β β γ η              (5)
In order to keep the size of the database as large as possible, only those in-
stitutions are excluded from the analysis that had no tax payment in the balance 
sheets in the observed period, or the natural logarithm of the Z-score could not 
be adequately calculated. With these exclusions, the analysis includes 22 com-
mercial banks and 18 insurance companies. The publicly available accounting 
(balance sheet and profit statement) data are from the homepage of the central 
bank of Hungary (MNB). 
It should be noted that compared to de Nicolò (2010), one of the key differ-
ences is that this paper also presents insurance sector-related results, as a com-
parison of banking and insurance results may provide an interesting insight into 
the diversity of the financial system. 
As Shackelford et al. (2010) point out, the potential “distribution” of the tax 
burden may also be an interesting research subject. It belongs to the limitations 
of our paper that tax incidence effects are not analysed (although it may also be 
a relevant question since price elasticities of demand and supply are not readily 
observable in the financial sector and thus are relatively complex to model. See 
Weder di Mauro 2010).  
Table 1. Effect of logarithmisation on the skewness measure 
Z score ln Z
banking 1.252 –0.442
insurance 0.841 –0.647
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3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The estimated forecasting model for capital formation in de Nicolò (2010), de-
scribed by Equation (1), suggests that a change in after-tax returns may theoreti-
cally influence the expansion of investments and capital formation. Table 2 shows 
the results of this forecasting model for the Hungarian commercial banking and 
insurance sector. The results in Table 2 are estimated with a fixed effects model 
for both sectors (with time dummies for banking sector data and without time 
dummies for insurance sector data, by applying only significant time dummies). 
The debate about the choice between fixed effects and random effects estima-
tors has a long history in econometric literature. Nerlove – Balestra (1992) sug-
gest that fixed effects models are appropriate, if a population is sampled exhaus-
tively or if the prediction of individual behaviour is needed. Wooldridge (2010: 
286) argues that the key issue is whether or not the unobserved effect is uncor-
related with the observed explanatory variables. As emphasised also by Baltagi et 
al. (2003), the decision about the choice of fixed effects or random effects models 
may be based on the results of the standard Hausman test (about the conditional 
mean of the disturbances given the regressors being zero). In the following, re-
sults of the Hausman test are applied for the choice between the fixed effects and 
random effects estimators. The empirical significance level for the Hausman test 
is below 0.02 in case of both analyses in Table 2.
Return on assets has a significant (increasing) effect on capital formation of 
banks in de Nicolò (2010). For Equation (1), the empirical results reveal a signifi-
cant difference between the results in de Nicolò (2010) and the analysis of Hun-
garian commercial banking sector data (where this effect is not significant). The 
results for the Hungarian insurance sector data are similar to those in de Nicolò 
(2010), but the estimated coefficient for return on equity is higher, and the other es-
timated coefficients also differ. The results for the Hungarian commercial banking 
sector show that past return did not have a significant effect on capital formation. 
Table 2. Forecasting model for capital formation 
 Banking Insurance
ROA(t–1) 0.0795 0.5121
(0.6568) (0.0000)
lnA(t–1) 0.0428 0.0305
(0.0000) (0.0007)
constant –0.5586 –0.5386
 (0.0000) (0.0005)
Source: Own calculations (p-values in parentheses).
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In de Nicolò (2010), corporate taxation has a negative effect on capital for-
mation and asset growth, and also increases bank risk (measured by the Black-
Scholes-Merton probability of default). The effective tax rate appears in Equation 
(2) in the model, and according to the results in de Nicolò (2010), the effective tax 
rate has a significant negative impact on asset growth. Table 3 shows estimation 
results (calculated with a fixed effects model with time dummies) in the case of 
Equation (2). The results in Table 3 differ significantly from those in de Nicolò 
(2010), since the estimated coefficient belonging to the effective tax rate does not 
significantly differ from zero (neither for banking sector data, nor for the insur-
ance sector). 
Similarly to Equation (1), the estimation results for the forecasting model in 
Equation (2) also reveal interesting differences between banking and insurance 
sector results. The effect of equity to asset ratio increase is significant, but oppo-
site in these two sectors: while an increase in the equity to asset ratio (“increased 
capital”) increases asset growth in the insurance sector (similarly to the result 
in de Nicolò 2010), it has a decreasing effect on asset growth in the commercial 
banking sector. 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for Equation (5), with the natural loga-
rithm of the Z-score in Equation (4) being the solvency risk measure in the model. 
In this case, a random effects model was applied, as the p-values of the Hausman 
test were above 0.5 in both analyses. In the case of insurance sector data, time 
dummies were applied, but (due to the lack of overall significance) time dummies 
were not used for commercial banking sector data. 
A major difference between the results of de Nicolò (2010) and ours is that 
taxation does not seem to have a significant impact on solvency risk. Since ef-
fective tax rate does not influence asset growth, an effect of taxation on solvency 
Table 3. Forecasting model for asset growth 
 Banking Insurance
TB(t–1) 0.0025 0.0521
(0.9848) (0.5359)
ROA(t–1) 2.835 0.1213
(0.0463) (0.7123)
EA(t–1) –1.4187 0.3904
(0.0359) (0.0235)
lnA(t–1) –0.5268 –0.1921
(0.0000) (0.0000)
constant 6.9589 3.3037
 (0.0000) (0.0000)
Source: Own calculations (p-values in parentheses).
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risk (through asset growth) is not significant, neither for Hungarian commercial 
banking, nor for the insurance sector data. It is also interesting that asset growth 
does not have a significant effect on the solvency risk measure either (although 
this effect is significant in de Nicolò 2010). 
As far as differences between commercial banking and insurance sector are 
concerned, the estimation results for Equation (3) are quite similar in these two 
sectors: for example, an increase in the return on assets or in the equity to asset 
ratio significantly increases solvency in both sectors. 
4. CONCLUSIONS
The solvency of financial intermediaries received increased attention in the af-
termath of the recent international financial crisis. Numerous studies examined 
how solvency could be strengthened and strove to discover ways to decrease in-
solvency risk when possible interactions of taxation and solvency are also con-
sidered. This paper aimed to contribute to the previous literature by analysing 
some aspects of this relationship based on panel data of Hungarian commercial 
banks and insurance companies. The contribution of the paper is partly related 
to the empirical model construction and partly to a comparison of banking and 
insurance sector results. 
The forecasting models for capital formation, asset growth, and solvency risk 
are similar to those in de Nicolò (2010), although with a major difference that 
concerns the definition of risk. Instead of using the (partly market data-based) 
Black-Scholes-Merton probability of default as a risk measure, the paper applies 
(similarly to some other studies) an accounting data-based solvency measure. 
Table 4. Forecasting model for solvency risk 
 Banking Insurance
ROA(t–1) 4.8257 2.6766
(0.0006) (0.0002)
EA(t–1) 3.1911 1.0457
(0.0000) (0.0031)
lnA(t–1) 0.0376 0.0165
(0.5375) (0.8017)
AG(t–1) –0.0100 –0.0543
(0.9056) (0.6127)
constant 1.4286 1.2040
 (0.0859) (0.3179)
Source: Own calculations (p-values in parentheses).
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With the analysis of a large unbalanced panel of US banks during 1995–2009, de 
Nicolò (2010) assessed the potential impact of different levels of proposed tax 
alternatives on bank asset growth and banks’ probability of default by conclud-
ing that these effects are negative, but quantitatively small. Compared to these 
results, the most important result is that (in contrast to the results in de Nicolò 
2010), no significant effect of the taxation on solvency risk could be found with 
panel data analysis, either for the Hungarian commercial banking sector, or for 
the Hungarian insurance sector. 
The empirical analysis also revealed interesting differences between the bank-
ing and insurance sector. Some insurance sector results (for example related to 
the effect of returns on capital formation) are similar to those in de Nicolò (2010), 
while the corresponding results for the commercial banking sector (about the 
capital formation effect of returns) differ significantly. 
Our results indicate that regarding the relationship of asset growth and capital 
formation, the Hungarian financial intermediation sector cannot be considered as 
homogeneous. However, as far as the relationship of taxation and solvency is con-
cerned, Hungarian commercial banking and insurance results are quite similar. 
There are several ways in which the presented model could be developed. 
Directions for future research include the modelling of tax incidence and a more 
thorough analysis of the relationship of bank asset growth and macroeconomic 
factors. 
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